In a scenario where two risk-neutral parties S (supplier) and B (Buyer) can make profit by working together, it is efficient to work together as long as the buyers' valuation exceeds the sellers' costs (Schmitz, 2001). Underinvestment may occur only when the agent fails to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium. The bargaining process can be seen as a game with multiple equilibria. Consequently, predictions of the outcome are very sensitive to assumptions made about the bargaining process. Underinvestment occurs because investors cannot guarantee themselves a sufficient share of the return through ex post bargaining. It is often argued that the possibility of a hold-up can lead to underinvestment in relation-specific investment and thus inefficiency. The hold-up problem leads to severe economic cost and might also lead to underinvestment. When party A has made a prior commitment to a relationship with party B, the latter can 'hold up' the former for the value of that commitment. The hold-up problem is a situation where two parties may be able to work most efficiently by cooperating but refrain from doing so because of concerns that they may give the other party increased bargaining power and thus reduce their own profits. The specific form of the optimal transaction (such as quality-level specifications, time of delivery, what quantity of units) cannot be determined with certainty beforehand.Parties to a future transaction must make noncontractible relationship-specific investments before the transaction takes place.A hold-up problem arises when two factors are present:
In economics, the hold-up problem (or commitment problem) is central to the theory of incomplete contracts, and shows the difficulty in writing complete contracts.
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